The Political Consequences of Indigenous Resentment

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*U*nderstanding the legacy of settler colonialism requires understanding the nature and scope of anti-Indigenous attitudes. But what, exactly, are the political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes? Answering this question requires recognizing that attitudes toward Indigenous peoples are distinct from White racial attitudes toward other disempowered groups. In this paper, I introduce a novel measure of Indigenous resentment. I then show that Indigenous resentment is an important predictor of policy attitudes using data collected from an original survey of White settlers. I estimate the effect of both Indigenous resentment and overt prejudice on policy attitudes—opposition to welfare and support for pipeline developments—to make the case that Indigenous resentment is a better measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes than explicit dislike, and that Indigenous resentment is an important omitted variable in the study of public opinion in settler societies.

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INTRODUCTION

Most quantitative research related to the legacy of White settler racism focuses on "perceived Aboriginal deficits" (Walter and Andersen 2013, p. 26). For instance, on gaps between Indigenous peoples and settlers on social and economic outcomes such as employment, income, and incarceration rates. It is an important omission that very little quantitative research considers the legacy of White settler racism in terms of ongoing *anti-Indigenous attitudes*. Overt racism toward Indigenous[1] peoples—the belief in the intrinsic, biological inferiority of Indigenous peoples—helped motivate and justify the mass dispossession of Indigenous lands and attempted genocide of Indigenous peoples. Today, democratic norms prevent most settlers from

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This is a manuscript submitted for review.

[1]A note on terminology: "Indigenous peoples" is commonly used in international or scholarly discourse. When possible I try to use the distinct nation names that peoples commonly identify themselves by (such as Anishinaabe, Dene, or Haida) but where a global term is appropriate I use the term Indigenous.

openly endorsing the idea that Indigenous peoples are intrinsically inferior and should be eliminated. Democratic norms even prevent most settlers from openly admitting overt dislike for Indigenous peoples. But how should subtler anti-Indigenous attitudes be measured? And what are the ongoing political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes?

In this article, I use original survey data and a novel scale measuring *Indigenous resentment*. The goals of this article are to introduce a theoretically-informed, quantitative measure of Indigenous resentment to the political science canon and to offer an empirical look at the political consequences of Indigenous resentment in settler-colonial states. In Section 2, I draw on Indigenous political thought and settler-colonial theories to make the case that anti-Indigenous attitudes are distinct from Whites' other racial attitudes. Most importantly, I argue that mapping the psychological contours of hierarchical social relations in settler-colonial contexts requires recognizing the relationship between White racism and territory; any valid measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes should tap into struggles over *land*. I also consider existing efforts to quantitatively study anti-Indigenous attitudes. Drawing on my theoretical discussion, I outline the limitations of existing approaches. Although these measures offer a useful starting point, they are insufficient insofar as they either tap into overt prejudice (such as "old fashioned racism") or they merely use measures of anti-Black attitudes—for instance, switching the word "Black" for "Native American" (Neblo 2009)—and thus fail to tap into distinct features characterizing Indigeneity and Indigenous-settler relations.

In this section I explain that there are good reasons to suspect anti-Indigenous attitudes impact important policy outcomes. Just as anti-Black attitudes motivate White opposition to welfare, there is evidence that prejudice toward Indigenous peoples also motivates opposition to welfare. Furthermore, given Indigenous peoples' relations to land, conflicts between Indigenous peoples and settlers often emerge in the context of settler efforts to expropriate and exploit natural resources on Indigenous territories. It also may be the case that White settlers' attitudes toward Indigenous peoples impact their attitudes toward resource extraction.

In Section 3, I introduce the novel measure of Indigenous resentment. The concept of Indigenous resentment draws on the symbolic racism literature, particularly the racism resentment literature (Kinder et al. 1996; Enders and Scott 2019). However, the Indigenous resentment scale is unique in

that it also taps into settlers' attitudes toward Indigenous land-claims, languages, and the belief that Indigenous peoples have unfair tax benefits; attitudes not normally associated with Black peoples in Anglo-settler colonies such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In this section I also outline my methodology, which involves estimating two important policy outcomes: attitudes toward redistribution (opposition to welfare) and attitudes toward resource extraction (building pipelines).

In Section 4, I offer an original analysis of the political consequences of Indigenous resentment. my analysis accomplishes two tasks: first, I show that Indigenous resentment predicts opposition to welfare and support for building pipelines. Second, I show that Indigenous resentment is a better predictor of support for these policies than a measure of overt prejudice. Overt anti-Indigenous prejudice has a significant but small impact on opposition to welfare and does not significantly predict support for pipeline developments. my analysis demonstrates the usefulness of using a measure of Indigenous resentment—a more subtle and valid measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes—in political science research. I discuss the implications of my findings in Section 5, and conclude by outlining an agenda for future studies. I point to the potential for comparative work on anti-Indigenous attitudes both across Anglo-settler states and the global south, the intersection of anti-Indigenous and anti-immigrant attitudes, and to the potential contribution that studying settler-colonialism can make to my understanding of White in-group attitudes (White consciousness) (*c.f.* Jardina 2019).

THEORY AND LITERATURE

Belief Systems in Settler Colonies

Indigeneity is defined by peoples' distinctive ties to specific territories that pre-date later colonization and settlement. In my present work, I focus on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the Anglo-settler colonies of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but my work likely has applications to other settler-colonial contexts. Settler colonization is the processes by which an imperial state takes over sovereignty by sending settlers to establish political control over territories and the populations inhabiting those territories (Wolfe 2006; Veracini 2010). In Anglo-settler states, the belief systems of

White racism and *liberal colonialism* played a central role in motivating and justifying processes of settler colonization.

White racism (which I also refer to as racism) refers to belief systems justifying White supremacy, or "the system of domination by which White people have historically ruled over and, in certain important ways, continue to rule over non-White people" (Mills 2014, pp. 1–2). White racism refers to the "common conceptual denominator" that ultimately signifies "global statuses of superiority and inferiority, privilege and subordination" (Mills 2014, p. 21). As Mills (2014, p. 21) points out, these statuses have taken different forms—distinctions based on geography (European/non-European), religion (Christian/heathen), or level of cultural development (civilized/wild or savage)—but these distinctions all eventually coalesce "in the basic opposition of White versus non-White."

Racism worked in conjunction with *liberal colonialism* to justify processes of colonization in Anglo-settler states. Liberal colonialism is an ideological framework characterized by commitment to private property, capitalism, and industry (Arneil 2017, p. 30). Liberal colonialism "constitutes citizens and civil society in explicit opposition to the idle, irrational, custom-bound 'Indian' who may be transformed into a citizen but only if he/she gives up his/her 'customs' or 'ways' and instead becomes industrious and rational" (Arneil 2012, p. 492). White racism and liberal colonialism were linked in that Indigenous peoples' purported wildness and inability to engage in "productive" activities—such as exploiting natural resources—were used to distinguish Indigenous peoples as inferior (non-White). Indigenous peoples' categorization as non-White thus excluded them from the basic moral obligations—treating others as ends in themselves (Kant 2013)—that White people in democracies normally extend to one another.

During the initial settlement of Anglo-settler states, leading officials and writers were not shy about describing Indigenous peoples as unproductive and irrational savages and thus the expropriation of Indigenous land and elimination of Indigenous life as justified. U.S. President William Henry Harrison, when he was Governor of the Indiana Territory, clearly articulated the opposition of White versus not-White when, with respect to displacing Indigenous peoples, he rhetorically asked:

"Is one of the fairest portions of the globe to remain in a state of nature, the haunt of a few wretched savages, when it seems destined, by the Creator, to give support to a large

population, and to be the seat of civilization, of science, and true religion?" (cited in Esarey 1915, p. 449)

In addition to displacement, assimilation was used as a tool to try and eliminate Indigenous peoples. A policy of "aggressive civilization" was developed during Ulysses S. Grant's post-Civil War administration, which included "industrial schools" to teach Indigenous children Christianity and prepare them for menial work (Smith 2001). Inspired by American industrial schools, Canadian policy-makers dramatically expanded an already existing Indian residential school system, which involved incarcerating Indigenous children at boarding schools, often against the will of the children and their families. P. G. Anderson, Canada's Indian Affairs Superintendent, clearly articulated the motivating ideologies of liberal colonialism and White racism when he explained to the General Council of Indian Chiefs and Principle Men why their children would be removed from their families and sent to residential schools:

> "You would not give up your idle roving habits, to enable your children to receive instruction. Therefore you remain poor, ignorant and miserable. It is found you cannot govern yourselves... It has therefore been determined, that your children shall be sent to schools, where they will forget their Indian habits and be instructed in all the necessary arts of civilized life, and become one with your White brethren" (quoted in Baldwin 1846, p. 7).

In response to a report detailing the the high morbidity rate of Indigenous children incarcerated in state institutions, Duncan Campell Scott, the Superintendent of Canada's Indian Affairs, explicitly stated that the "policy of this Department... is geared towards a final solution of my Indian problem" (quoted in Talaga 2018). Canada's Indian residential school system resulted in the recorded deaths of 3,200 children, although actual numbers are likely higher (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015).

Today, democratic norms prevent most people from endorsing the idea that Indigenous peoples—or any peoples—are explicitly inferior and should be exterminated. But does the legacy of these belief systems manifest in subtler anti-Indigenous attitudes today? And what are the political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes?

Existing Research on Anti-Indigenous Attitudes

Measuring Anti-Indigenous Attitudes   Only a few researchers have tried to quantitatively study settler attitudes toward Indigenous peoples, and most have focused on *overtly hostile measures* of anti-Indigenous attitudes. For instance, scholars have adapted measures of "old fashioned racism" (or Jim Crow racism), which were originally developed to tap into the explicit belief in the inferiority of Black Americans and support for segregation (Henry and Sears 2002). Measures of old fashioned racism include scales asking whether respondents endorse the idea that Indigenous peoples are alcoholics, on welfare, or are bad parents (Morrison et al. 2008), and scales tapping into the belief that Indigenous peoples are lazy (Harell et al. 2016) or are "a bunch of complainers" (Langford and Ponting 1992). Walker (1994) developed an "Attitudes Toward Aborigines Scale" which includes a number of explicitly hostile indicators, including whether respondents endorse the statement: "I don't like Aborigines" (see also Pedersen and Walker 1997). In a similar vein, researchers have used self-reported measures of overt prejudice, including self-reported discomfort being around Indigenous peoples (Berry and Kalin 1995) or feeling thermometer ratings of Indigenous peoples and other group members (Harell et al. 2014; Donakowski and Esses 1996).

While it is interesting to study overt prejudice, social desirability prevents many respondents from openly admitting to prejudicial attitudes. As I will show, measures of overt prejudice are not as effective at discriminating between respondents with different attitudes since most respondents simply refuse to explicitly indicate aversions toward different social group members. As a result, measures of overt prejudice tend to grossly underestimate the effect of anti-Indigenous attitudes on policy preferences.

Less work has considered *subtler measures*[2] of symbolic racism directed toward Indigenous peoples. By "symbolic racism" I are referring to a belief system combining negative affect and the belief that the

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[2]Yet another line of research considers *implicit measures* of anti-Indigenous attitudes (e.g., Saminaden et al. 2010; Devos et al. 2007; Chaney et al. 2011). The purpose of this present work is to develop a scale that taps into a set of subtler anti-Indigenous attitudes, not implicit associations. By *subtler attitudes* I mean attitudes that people are aware of (these attitudes exist at the level of cognitive awareness—they are *not* implicit associations that manifest below the level of cognitive awareness) but these attitudes are subtler in the sense that they are not explicitly *hostile* (they are not expressions of "old-fashioned racism" or explicit dislike.

target group violates cherished values of hard work and industry—what Americans call "conservative" values (Henry and Sears 2002), but what others might call "liberal colonial values" (e.g., see Arneil 2012). Under the broader rubric of "symbolic racism" I include operationalizations of modern racism (McConahay 1986), symbolic racism (Sears 1988), subtle racism (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997), and racial resentment (Kinder et al. 1996; Enders 2019) (see Henry and Sears (2002) for an overview of this literature).

Existing efforts to study symbolic racism against Indigenous peoples have relied directly on instruments designed to measure anti-Black attitudes. Some authors have used the Racial Resentment Scale items, replacing the word "Blacks" with "Native Americans" in the U.S. (Neblo 2009) or with "Aboriginals" in the Canadian context (Harell et al. 2016). Others have used the Modern Racism Scale (Morrison et al. 2008).

However, these tools were designed to tap into White attitudes toward Black Americans, and there are reasons to believe that White settlers' attitudes toward Indigenous peoples are distinct. Most importantly, none of the adapted measures of symbolic racism ask about land. As Dene scholar Coulthard (2014, p. 13) explains, processes of colonization (and decolonization) are "best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and oriented around the question of land" (see also Green and Green 2007; Simpson 2011; Wildcat et al. 2014; Singh 2019); any valid measure of settlers' attitudes toward Indigenous peoples must tap into conflicts over land. Treaties between settler governments and Indigenous peoples also mean Indigenous peoples may enjoy rights—or there may be discourses that Indigenous peoples enjoy rights—that are distinct from settlers' rights with respect to things like taxation. Indigenous peoples may also make demands that are rarely made by racial group members, including Black Americans, related to support for traditional languages.

The Political Consequences of Anti-Indigenous Attitudes   Another downside of existing research on anti-Indigenous attitudes—at least with respect to the study of politics—is that few of these studies consider the *political consequences* of anti-Indigenous attitudes (with the exception of Harell et al. (2014) and Harell et al. (2016)). Much of the pioneering work on anti-Indigenous attitudes has been done by psychologists interested in anti-Indigenous attitudes as an outcome or the effect of anti-Indigenous attitudes on outcomes such as classroom helping behaviors (Werhun and Penner

2010). In political science, Neblo (2009) compares racial attitudes toward Black Americans and Indigenous peoples using the Racial Resentment Scale items (replacing the word "Blacks" with "Native Americans") but does not discuss whether anti-Indigenous attitudes predict policy outcomes.

The main work on anti-Indigenous attitudes in political science has been conducted by Harell et al. (2014), who show that—just as anti-Black attitudes predict opposition to welfare (Gilens 1995)—overt prejudice toward Indigenous peoples predicts opposition to welfare.[3] In my present work, I replicate these findings but also show that overt prejudice *underestimates* the effect of anti-Indigenous attitudes on opposition to welfare. Furthermore, although redistribution is important for empowering Indigenous peoples, another distinct policy area that distinctly impacts Indigenous peoples is resource extraction and development. There are strong theoretical reasons to suspect anti-Indigenous attitudes and resource development are related: recall, the devaluation of Indigenous peoples and their relations to land helped European settlers justify the expropriation and exploitation of Indigenous territories (Arneil 2012; Coulthard 2014). As I show, Indigenous resentment significantly predicts support for new pipeline developments.

METHODS

Data and Analysis

Data was collected between March 2019–May 2019. Respondents were recruited using Dynata's (formerly Survey Sampling International's) online panels. my sample is an (otherwise representative) sample of White, English-speaking Canadians ($n = 1,150$). White, English-speaking Canadians constitute a numerical majority in Canada and have historically monopolized political power at the national level and so it is important to understand their racial attitudes. Missing values on the outcomes and primary independent variables were dropped through list-wise deletion (see (Table S1). I used multiple imputation by chained equations using the MICE package in R to deal with missing data on

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[3]In excellent comparative experimental work, Harell et al. (2016) use an experiment to show that Canadians are less willing to redistribute when target group members are Indigenous.

socio-demographic control variables.[4]

With respect to my analysis, for each outcome (opposition to welfare and support for pipelines), I estimate three OLS regression models.[5] For each outcome I first estimate an *omitted variable model* that does not include any measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes but that does include basic covariates considered important in political science research. Second, I estimate a *prejudice model* that predicts the effect of overt prejudice on each outcome, controlling for covariates. Third, I estimate an *Indigenous resentment model* that predicts the effect of Indigenous resentment on each outcome, controlling for covariates. The purpose of this is to demonstrate that anti-Indigenous attitudes are an important omitted variable in the study of settler-colonial societies; and furthermore, that anti-Indigenous attitudes are best operationalized using a scale of Indigenous resentment (rather than a measure of overt prejudice).

Outcomes Variables: Policy Preferences

The first outcome of interest, *opposition to welfare*, is measured using a five-category item asking respondents to indicate if they think the government should spend more, the same, or less on welfare, coded so higher values indicate greater *opposition* to welfare spending. The second outcome of interest, *support for pipeline development*, is measured using a five-category item asking respondents to indicate their agreement with the statement that: "No new gas pipelines should be built in Canada, even if this hurts the economy." The item is coded so higher values indicate more disagreement (more *support* for pipeline development). The outcome variables are rescaled to range from '0' to '1'. The distribution

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[4]There was relatively little missing data (Table S1). Still, multiple imputation is generally preferable to list-wise deletion because it accounts for uncertainty and thus yields more accurate standard errors (Azur et al. 2011). However, imputing missing data on outcome variables is controversial; since this is not a hill I want to die on, I dealt with missing on the DV and primary IV through list-wise deletion. As a robustness check, I also estimated my models with the original, non-imputed data (dropping all missing through list-wise deletion). Despite the slightly smaller n, the results are not substantively different. The original, non-imputed data is published with the imputed dataset and scholars can replicate the analysis on either.

[5]Treating the outcomes as categorical and estimating ordered logit models does not change the substantive results (see SM, Section , Table S2 and Table S3).

across the categories of the variables are presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1. Outcome Variable Distributions

Variable	Obs.	Percent
"No new pipelines should be built in Canada, even if this hurts the economy."		
Agree strongly	120	10.80
Agree somewhat	129	11.61
Neither agree nor disagree	290	26.10
Disagree somewhat	232	20.88
Disagree strongly	340	30.60
Total	1,111	100.00
"Should the federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now on welfare?"		
A lot more	163	14.67
Somewhat more	245	22.05
About the same as now	450	40.50
Somewhat less	153	13.77
A lot less	100	9.00
Total	1,111	100.00

Independent Variables

Operationalizing Indigenous Resentment   The main independent variable of interest is Indigenous resentment, measured by seven Likert-type questions tapping into anti-Indigenous attitudes (Table 2). The response options for each question range from "Disagree strongly", "Disagree", "Neither agree nor disagree," "Agree," to "Agree strongly" and are are coded such that the higher values indicate greater resentment. Together these seven items comprise a highly reliable[6] scale measuring Indigenous resentment. A note on terminology: although "Indigenous peoples" is used in scholarly

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[6]Item analysis reveals strong internal reliability ($\alpha = 0.89$) and that the reliability of the Indigenous resentment scale would decrease if any of the items are excluded. A note to reviewers: I detail the construction of the Indigenous Resentment Scale in greater detail in "Measuring Anti-Indigenous Attitudes: The Indigenous Resentment Scale" (under review elsewhere). The measurement paper is a very technical paper that does not consider the political consequences of Indigenous resentment.

circles, this term may be less familiar with non-academic audiences. In Australia and Canada, the term "Aboriginal" is more familiar in non-academic discourses while in the United States the term "Native American" is more familiar. In my survey, I asked the Canadian respondents about their attitudes toward "Aboriginals." I define the term for respondents the first time it appears as including peoples of First Nation, Inuk (Inuit), or Métis descent.

We used factor analysis to construct the Indigenous resentment scale from seven variables tapping into anti-Indigenous attitudes (Table 2). Each of the variables load strongly onto a single, underlying factor (the results of a scree test are presented in the SM, see Figure S1). The extracted factor, my measure of Indigenous resentment, was standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The distribution of Indigenous resentment is presented in Figure 1. Note that the item asking whether Indigenous peoples are "getting too demanding in their push for land rights" correlates most strongly underlying, latent factor (as shown by the factor loading of 0.88). In other words, of the seven items tapping into the underlying factor, the feature measuring attitudes toward land claims is most strongly related to the underlying concept of Indigenous resentment. This reinforces the intuition that Indigenous resentment is a distinct expression of racial attitudes related to settler land expropriation and settler-Indigenous conflicts over *land*.

TABLE 2. Indigenous Resentment Scale Items

Variables	Loadings
"Aboriginal activists are making reasonable demands." (R)	0.71
"Aboriginals are getting too demanding in their push for land rights."	0.87
"Aboriginals get more favours from the education system than they should have."	0.73
"Irish, Jewish, Chinese, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Aboriginals should do the same without any special favours."	0.76
"More must be done to protect Aboriginal languages." (R)	0.69
"The government does not show enough respect toward Aboriginals." (R)	0.74
"Aboriginals get unfair tax breaks."	0.70

We also include a measure of overt prejudice. This measure was created by subtracting the difference of respondents' feelings toward Indigenous peoples from their average feelings toward a number of social group members (Aboriginals, Atheists, Blacks, Canadians, Christians, and immigrants). Feelings

were measured by asking respondents how they feel about different groups, where zero means they really dislike the group and 100 means they really like the group. The resulting scale was was standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 (the same as the Indigenous resentment scale), for ease of comparison. The distribution of overt prejudice is presented in Figure 2. As can be seen, the distribution of prejudice is tightly clustered around the mean. This is because the plurality of respondents refused to express prejudice for *any* groups; that is, a plurality of respondents gave all social groups the exact same rating on the feeling thermometers.

**FIGURE 1. Distribution of Indigenous Resentment**

FIGURE 2. Distribution of overt prejudice

TABLE 3. Variable Distributions

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Oppose welfare	1,111	0.451	0.282	0	1
Support pipelines	1,111	0.622	0.330	0	1
Indigenous Resentment	1,111	-0.003	1.000	-1.995	1.954
Explicit prejudice	1,111	-0.001	1.000	-3.432	5.293
Right vote	1,111	0.444	0.497	0	1
Male	1,111	0.478	0.500	0	1
Education					
No college degree	1,111	0.342	0.475	0	1
Trade	1,111	0.294	0.456	0	1
BA	1,111	0.266	0.442	0	1
Grad	1,111	0.098	0.298	0	1
Income					
$29,999 or less	1,111	0.171	0.377	0	1
$30,000 to $59,999	1,111	0.252	0.434	0	1
$60,000 to $89,999	1,111	0.206	0.405	0	1
$90,000 to $119,999	1,111	0.169	0.375	0	1
$120,000-$149,999	1,111	0.113	0.316	0	1
$150,000+	1,111	0.089	0.285	0	1
Age category					
18–34	1,111	0.191	0.393	0	1
35–44	1,111	0.219	0.414	0	1
45–54	1,111	0.227	0.419	0	1
55–64	1,111	0.299	0.456	0	1
65+	1,111	0.068	0.253	0	1
Region					
British Columbia	1,111	0.136	0.343	0	1
Prairies	1,111	0.193	0.395	0	1
Ontario	1,111	0.442	0.497	0	1
English Quebec	1,111	0.150	0.358	0	1
Maritimes	1,111	0.079	0.270	0	1
Urban	1,111	0.715	0.452	0	1

Correlates of Indigenous Resentment Respondent age is measured with a five-category variable (18–34 years, 35–44 years, 45–54 years, 55–64 years, and 65 years and older). The median Canadian age category (35–44 years) is the reference category. Education is measured using a five-category variable: no degree (the reference category), trade school diploma, four-year university or college degree, and post-graduate or professional degree. Gender is a dummy variable indicating if a respondent self-identified as men (male= 1). Only four respondents indicated a non-binary identity, which is

not a sufficient number of people to include as a separate category. As such, I included women and transgender/ gender non-conforming respondents together in the reference category. Excluding transgender/ gender non-conforming respondents from the analysis does not change the results and would represent an unnecessary exclusion. I consider five regions: British Columbia, the Prairies, Ontario, English-speaking Québec, and the Maritimes. In my analyses, Canada's most populous province, Ontario, is the reference category. Recall that my sample (and generalizations) are limited to English-speakers. This of course requires particular restraint when generalizing from Québec—a majority French-speaking region—since these only reflect the attitudes of English-speakers in Québec. I also include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent lives in a metropolitan city (city= 1, else= 0).[7]

Partisan politics is operationalized with a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent said they vote for a right-of-center party (Conservative Party or People's Party). The reference category includes all non-right party voters (voters who indicated they supported the Liberal Party, New Democratic Party, Green Party, other left parties, or were undecided). Canada's two major parties, the Conservatives and Liberals, are "big tent" parties that contain a great deal of ideological diversity. As such, I also include an 11-point measure of ideology, which asks respondents: "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right.' How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?" (Left 0 ... 10 Right). The results of a VIF test show that collinearity is not a problem (both the measure of right-party support and ideology can be included in the regression models).

RESULTS

Opposition to Welfare

Congruent with existing literature, explicit anti-Indigenous prejudice significantly predicts opposition to welfare (Table 4, Model 2). However, prejudice has a relatively small impact on the outcome. A one

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[7]"Else" includes both respondents who live in rural areas and suburbs. Although suburban life may be more similar to city life in many respects, when it comes to attitudes toward Indigenous peoples (the primary concept of interest), suburban dwellers' attitudes are more similar to rural that city folk.)

standard deviation increase in prejudice increases opposition to welfare by less than half a point on the five-category measure of anti-welfare attitudes. By contrast, a one standard deviation increase in Indigenous resentment increases opposition to welfare by nearly a full point on the same scale (Table 4, Model 3). Comparing the model fit statistics shows that including the Indigenous resentment scale results in an impressive improvement of model fit over the other models.

TABLE 4. Model Predicting Opposition to Welfare

	Dependent variable:		
	Opposition to Welfare		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Explicit Prejudice		0.042***	
		(0.008)	
Indigenous Resentment			0.083***
			(0.009)
Right Vote	0.154***	0.145***	0.123***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Ideology	0.010*	0.008*	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Male	−0.014	−0.017	−0.039*
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education (No degree)			
Trade	0.031	0.031	0.019
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
BA	0.041	0.036	0.033
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Grad	−0.032	−0.024	−0.024
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Income ($60–$88K)			
$29K or less	−0.146***	−0.146***	−0.138***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
$30K-59K	−0.049*	−0.046*	−0.039
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
$90K-119K	−0.010	−0.012	−0.015
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
$120K-149K	−0.008	−0.017	−0.007
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)
$150K+	0.077*	0.067*	0.067*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Age (35–44 years)			
18-34	−0.008	−0.008	0.003

	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
45-54	−0.025	−0.021	−0.019
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
55-64	0.034	0.039	0.046*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
65+	0.001	0.006	0.017
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Region (Ontario)			
BC	−0.035	−0.037	−0.061*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Prairies	−0.036	−0.051*	−0.069**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
English Quebec	0.012	0.001	0.014
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Maritimes	0.021	0.021	0.012
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Urban	−0.039*	−0.042*	−0.026
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Constant	0.392***	0.411***	0.457***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Observations	1,111	1,111	1,111
R^2	0.164	0.185	0.230
Adjusted R^2	0.148	0.169	0.215
Residual Std. Error	0.260	0.257	0.249
F Statistic	10.675***	11.767***	15.517***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Comparing the omitted variable model (Table 4, Model 1) and the Indigenous resentment model (Table 4, Model 3) is also illustrative. Comparing the models reveals that Indigenous resentment mediates the impact of gender and region in important ways. Without controlling for Indigenous resentment (the omitted variable model), it appears that gender has no impact on attitudes toward redistribution. In fact, men express significantly higher levels of resentment (see Figure 3) and Indigenous resentment increases opposition to welfare. Accounting for the confounding effect of Indigenous resentment, I can see that men express significantly lower opposition to welfare than other Canadians.

FIGURE 3. Distribution of Indigenous Resentment by Gender

Similarly, without controlling for Indigenous resentment (the omitted variable model), it appears

that region has little impact on attitudes toward redistribution. In fact, region is significantly related to the omitted variable, with residents of British Columbia and the Prairies expressing significantly higher levels of Indigenous resentment as compared to residents of Canada's most populous province, Ontario (see Figure 4). Controlling for the effect of the omitted Indigenous resentment variable (Table S4, Model 3), I see that British Columbian and Prairie folk express significantly *less* opposition to welfare than Ontarians; that is, Western Canadians want more government spending on welfare than Ontarians. This is an interesting finding, given the dominance of right-of-center parties in Western Canada.

FIGURE 4. Distribution of Indigenous Resentment by Region

Support for Resource Extraction

With respect to support for extracting natural resources, there is no evidence that overt anti-Indigenous prejudice predicts support for pipeline developments (Table 5, Model 2). By contrast, Indigenous resentment has a significant effect on attitudes toward pipelines. Increasing Indigenous resentment by one standard deviation increases support for pipelines by half a point on the five-category outcome measure (Table 5, Model 3). Although Indigenous resentment only has a moderately-sized effect on support for pipelines, comparing the model fit statistics shows that including the Indigenous resentment scale improves model fit.

   Comparing the omitted variable model (Table 5, Model 1) and the Indigenous resentment model (Table 5, Model 3) again reveals that Indigenous resentment mediates the impact of gender on support for pipelines. Without controlling for Indigenous resentment (the omitted variable model), it appears that men are more supportive of pipelines. In fact, men express significantly higher levels of resentment (see Figure 3) and Indigenous resentment increases support for pipelines. Accounting for the confounding effect of Indigenous resentment, I can see that men express similar levels of support for pipelines as the rest of Canadians.

TABLE 5. Model Predicting Support for Pipelines

	Dependent variable:		
	Support for Pipelines		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Explicit Prejudice		−0.001	
		(0.009)	
Indigenous Resentment			0.052***
			(0.010)
Right Vote	0.089***	0.089***	0.069***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Ideology	0.021***	0.021***	0.016**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Male	0.049*	0.049*	0.033
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Education (No degree)			
Trade	0.009	0.009	0.002
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)

BA	0.030	0.030	0.025
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Grad	−0.036	−0.036	−0.030
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Income ($60–$88K)			
$29K or less	−0.077*	−0.077*	−0.072*
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
$30K-59K	−0.040	−0.040	−0.033
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
$90K-119K	−0.039	−0.039	−0.042
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)
$120K-149K	0.003	0.004	0.004
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
$50K+	0.059	0.059	0.052
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Age (35–44 years)			
18-34	−0.040	−0.040	−0.033
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
45-54	0.070*	0.070*	0.075**
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
55-64	0.135***	0.135***	0.143***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
65+	0.110**	0.110**	0.120**
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Region (Ontario)			
BC	−0.023	−0.023	−0.040
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Prairies	0.084***	0.085***	0.063*
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)
English Quebec	−0.034	−0.034	−0.033
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Maritimes	−0.008	−0.008	−0.014
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Urban	−0.049*	−0.049*	−0.040
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Constant	0.443***	0.442***	0.484***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Observations	1,111	1,111	1,111
R^2	0.167	0.167	0.186
Adjusted R^2	0.152	0.151	0.171
Residual Std. Error	0.304	0.304	0.301
F Statistic	10.922***	10.394***	11.877***

Note: $^*p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$

DISCUSSION

In settler-colonial states, attitudes toward Indigenous peoples have important implications for policy preferences. For one thing, anti-Indigenous attitudes are clearly related to opposition to welfare. Including either prejudice or—especially—Indigenous resentment in a model estimating opposition to welfare significantly improves model fit. my work replicates existing research showing that overt prejudice helps explain White settlers' opposition to redistribution. However, my work goes beyond existing studies by showing that overt prejudice is not the best way to identify the political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes. From a theoretical perspective, not all meaningful, negative outgroup attitudes are captured by measures of explicit dislike. For instance, settlers may not feel strong, explicit animosity but still hold subtler attitudes that are disempowering for Indigenous peoples—such as the belief that Indigenous peoples have gone too far in their push for land rights or do not deserve to have their languages protected. From a measurement perspective, measurement error—including social desirability bias—prevents measures of overt prejudice from capturing sufficient variation in anti-Indigenous attitudes.

The tools I use impact my results and the conclusions I draw. Because prejudice *underestimates* the effect of anti-Indigenous attitudes on opposition to welfare, a researcher might be tempted to conclude that prejudice has a significant but not a substantive impact on redistributive attitudes. However, as my analysis shows, using the proper tool—the Indigenous resentment scale—reveals that, in fact, anti-Indigenous attitudes have a significant and *substantive* impact on redistributive attitudes.

Our paper also shows that White settlers' attitudes are related to another important policy area that disproportionately impacts Indigenous peoples: exploiting natural resources. Indigenous resentment significantly increases support for building pipelines, even controlling for related covariates such as region, vote choice, and ideology. Including the Indigenous resentment scale in a model predicting pipeline support improves model fit, compared to the omitted variable model. This offers evidence for the argument made by many Indigenous scholars and activists that any real efforts to address climate change also require decolonization. It should also be noted that overt prejudice towards Indigenous peoples is not related to support for pipelines. Scholars measuring anti-Indigenous attitudes with a measure of overt prejudice would erroneously conclude that attitudes toward Indigenous peoples and

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extractive policies are unrelated.

Our present analysis does suffer certain limitations. First and foremost, my study only includes Canadian respondents. my work likely extends—albeit to varying degrees—to other Anglo-colonial contexts such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. However, future comparative studies are needed to clarify the impact of anti-Indigenous attitudes on policy attitudes in other Anglo-settler democracies. It would also be interesting to compare anti-Indigenous attitudes in Anglo-settler democracies to settler societies in the global south. Second, my analysis is limited to English-speaking, White Canadian settlers. Future Canadian research should endeavor to include settlers of color and French-speakers (Canada's second official, and second most commonly spoken language).

Our present work is also potentially open to the criticisms leveled at measures of symbolic racism— notably racial resentment—in the U.S. context. According to critics of the racial resentment scale, responses to the items that comprise the scale reflect "principled conservatism" (conservative ideology) instead of racial prejudice (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). However, recent U.S. research empirically tests whether the racial resentment survey items exhibit differential item functioning and finds that, even correcting for the influence of conservative principles, the racial resentment scale significantly predicts attitudes toward redistribution (Enders 2019). There is little reason to be concerned that racial resentment is merely an expression of "principled conservatism."

CONCLUSION

Our analysis uses original survey data and a novel scale measuring Indigenous resentment to offer an empirical look at the political consequences of White settler attitudes toward Indigenous peoples. Drawing on Indigenous and settler-colonial theory, I make the case that a valid measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes must be attentive to distinct contours of settler-Indigenous conflicts—particularly with respect to conflicts over land. my analysis demonstrates the usefulness of using a measure of Indigenous resentment—a more subtle and valid measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes—in political science research. I show that Indigenous resentment predicts important policy attitudes: opposition to welfare and support for extractive policies (building pipelines).

Furthermore, I show that Indigenous resentment is a better predictor of support for these policies than

a measure of overt anti-Indigenous prejudice. Replicating existing findings, I show that anti-Indigenous prejudice has a significant but small impact on opposition to welfare; measures of overt prejudice *underestimate* the impact of anti-Indigenous attitudes on opposition to welfare. I also show that overt prejudice does not significantly predict support for pipeline developments.

Going forward, future studies should endeavor to study anti-Indigenous attitudes in other post-colonial contexts to compare differences across contexts, both comparing attitudes in Anglo-settler states and comparing attitudes in former colonies in the global south. It would also be interesting to study Indigenous resentment over time in Canada. Indigenous peoples are the fastest growing population in Canada, and overtime analyses of settler attitudes could help identify how changing demographics impact settlers' racial attitudes. In addition to studying Indigenous resentment (measured in this study as a White out-group attitude), it would be interesting to consider whether demographic changes stemming from growing Indigenous populations also activate the salience of White in-group attitudes, or White consciousness. U.S. research shows that when the proportion of White people in a population decreases due to immigration, White consciousness—White peoples' identification with their in-group—increases (Jardina 2019). Identifying whether demographic changes stemming from growing Indigenous populations also activate White consciousness would clarify whether it is immigration (an increasing foreign-born population) or race (an increasing *non-White* population) that activates White consciousness.

With respect to outgroup attitudes and policy preferences, it would also be interesting to study the intersection of Indigeneity and immigration. Since President Donald Trump took office in the United States, five out of the six children who died while they were in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security were Indigenous (Nolan 2019). Often, border agents only provide translations in Spanish—forgetting the existence of Indigenous peoples in the Americas is resulting in tragic consequences. The death of Indigenous children in the custody of Anglo-settler state institutions did not end with the closing of the last Indian residential school. my present work has focused on the political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes—both explicit prejudice and Indigenous resentment—but future scholars might also consider the political consequences of *non-attitudes* toward Indigenous peoples (e.g., ambivalence, explicit lack of caring, lack of awareness, or endorsing the belief that

Indigenous peoples or their cultures have "disappeared").

Settler-colonialism is an important axis of inequality and should not be omitted from political science research. my work sets the groundwork for a new research agenda on racial attitudes and political behavior in settler-colonial contexts. In particular, I hope to illustrate the value in turning my gaze away from a strict focus on the perceived deficits of Indigenous peoples (Walter and Andersen 2013). Instead, more attention should be paid to the attitudes of the settlers who imagined the Indian problem into existence and to the lasting impact that White settlers' racial attitudes have had—and continue to have—on politics in settler-colonial states.

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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

Missing Values

Just over 1,600 Canadian respondents were recruited to participate in my study. As my study was restricted to White, English-Speaking Canadians, approximately 450 respondents who started the study were redirected out (were not permitted to complete the study) due to an ineligibility. I.e., they indicated they were a person of color, French-speaker, or were not a citizen and so were redirected out of the study. A total of 1,150 eligible participants completed the study. Respondents were permitted to skip questions. Because this was a panel of participants who are paid based on completion, there was relatively little missing data. Missing values on the outcome variables or main independent variables of interest were dealt with through list-wise deletion (the resulting $n = 1,111$). Missing values on socio-demographic controls were imputed using MICE (see Table S1.

TABLE S1. Missing Values

Item	Number of Missing Values	Procedure
Opposition to welfare	10	LWD
Support for pipelines	10	LWD
Indigenous Resentment scale items		
Reasonable	27	LWD
Land rights	28	LWD
Education favors	26	LWD
No favors	26	LWD
Protect language	25	LWD
No respect	27	LWD
Unfair tax	27	LWD
Prejudice	19	LWD
Age	54	MICE
Gender	21	MICE
Education	32	MICE
Region	4	MICE
City	73	MICE
Income	98	MICE
Ideology	8	MICE
Party Vote	16	MICE

Dimensionality

FIGURE S1. Scree Test on Indigenous Resentment Items

Scree plot

Alternate Model Specifications

Treating outcomes as categorical and estimating ordered logit regressions The two outcomes of interest—opposition to welfare and support for pipeline developments—are measured using five-category Likert-type variables (the response options were: agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly). Although likert-type outcome variables are often treated like numeric variables in fields like political science, some might argue that these are categorical (ordered factor) variables and thus are more appropriately modeled using ordered logistic regression (instead of OLS regression). As a robustness check, I treat the outcomes as categorical

variables and estimate the models using ordered logit. As the results in Table S2 and Table S3 show, the results are substantively identical. As such, I choose to present the results of the OLS regressions in the body of the paper because OLS coefficients are easier to interpret.

TABLE S2. Ordered Logit Model Predicting Opposition to Welfare

	Dependent variable:		
	Opposition to Welfare		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Explicit Prejudice		0.338***	
		(0.061)	
Indigenous Resentment			0.634***
			(0.067)
Right Vote	1.162***	1.117***	0.994***
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.131)
Ideology	0.066*	0.057	−0.007
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Male	−0.081	−0.102	−0.261*
	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.119)
Trade	0.207	0.207	0.108
	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.144)
BA	0.357*	0.336*	0.327*
	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.155)
Grad	−0.180	−0.133	−0.131
	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.217)
29K or less	−1.047***	−1.050***	−1.014***
	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.191)
30K-59K	−0.279	−0.270	−0.207
	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.168)
90K-119K	−0.036	−0.050	−0.080
	(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.186)
120K-149K	−0.041	−0.105	−0.049
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.205)
150K+	0.569*	0.512*	0.494*
	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.234)
18-34	−0.084	−0.085	−0.002
	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.179)
45-54	−0.179	−0.149	−0.140
	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.170)
55-64	0.254	0.305	0.377*
	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.160)
65+	0.047	0.080	0.144
	(0.240)	(0.240)	(0.241)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
BC	−0.286	−0.302	−0.473**
	(0.171)	(0.172)	(0.173)
Prairies	−0.301	−0.400**	−0.540***
	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.157)
English Quebec	0.120	0.065	0.146
	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.173)
Maritimes	0.119	0.101	0.050
	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.218)
Urban	−0.259*	−0.292*	−0.233
	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Observations	1,111	1,111	1,111

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

TABLE S3. Ordered Logit Model Predicting Support for Pipelines

	Dependent variable:		
	Support for Pipelines		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Explicit Prejudice		−0.006	
		(0.060)	
Indigenous Resentment			0.383***
			(0.065)
Right Vote	0.515***	0.516***	0.388**
	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.125)
Ideology	0.159***	0.159***	0.120***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Male	0.351**	0.352**	0.254*
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.119)
Trade	0.110	0.110	0.065
	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.142)
BA	0.236	0.237	0.226
	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.153)
Grad	−0.114	−0.115	−0.091
	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.216)
29K or less	−0.398*	−0.398*	−0.399*
	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.185)
30K-59K	−0.211	−0.211	−0.201
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)
90K-119K	−0.146	−0.145	−0.199
	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.184)
120K-149K	0.013	0.015	−0.017
	(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.205)
150K+	0.479*	0.481*	0.416

	(0.237)	(0.238)	(0.238)
18-34	−0.193	−0.193	−0.145
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.174)
45-54	0.395*	0.394*	0.458**
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.165)
55-64	0.859***	0.858***	0.942***
	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.162)
65+	0.716**	0.715**	0.812**
	(0.250)	(0.251)	(0.252)
BC	−0.089	−0.089	−0.188
	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.176)
Prairies	0.662***	0.664***	0.527**
	(0.159)	(0.160)	(0.161)
English Quebec	−0.147	−0.146	−0.129
	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.168)
Maritimes	0.011	0.011	−0.004
	(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.210)
Urban	−0.327*	−0.327*	−0.277*
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.128)
Observations	1,111	1,111	1,111
Note:			*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Controlling for experimental treatment This data was collected as part of a separate, unrelated study that included an experimental component. Because some of the variables were collected after the experimental treatment—specifically, the Indigenous resentment items and income (which, because it is considered a sensitive question, was asked at the end of the survey)—we have also estimated the models controlling for the treatment. This is to show that, even controlling for the treatment, the results are essentially identical. That is to say, I don't have to worry that the treatment biased the coefficients.

TABLE S4. Model Predicting Opposition to Welfare, Controlling for Treatment

	Dependent variable:		
	Opposition to Welfare		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Dependent variable:		
	Opposition to Welfare		
	(1)	(2)	(3)

Explicit Prejudice		0.042***	
		(0.008)	
Indigenous Resentment			0.083***
			(0.009)
Right Vote	0.155***	0.145***	0.123***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Ideology	0.010*	0.008*	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Male	−0.017	−0.020	−0.042*
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Trade	0.030	0.030	0.019
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
BA	0.041	0.036	0.033
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Grad	−0.032	−0.023	−0.023
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
29K or less	−0.148***	−0.147***	−0.139***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.025)
30K-59K	−0.051*	−0.048*	−0.041
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
90K-119K	−0.010	−0.013	−0.015
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
120K-149K	−0.009	−0.019	−0.009
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)
150K+	0.076*	0.065*	0.065*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)
18-34	−0.007	−0.008	0.003
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
45-54	−0.024	−0.020	−0.018
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
55-64	0.035	0.040	0.047*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
65+	0.001	0.006	0.016
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)
BC	−0.035	−0.037	−0.061*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Prairies	−0.036	−0.051*	−0.069**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
English Quebec	0.010	−0.0003	0.012
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Maritimes	0.022	0.023	0.014
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Urban	−0.039*	−0.042*	−0.026
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
treatment1	−0.022	−0.024	−0.027
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
treatment2	0.007	0.001	−0.002
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Constant	0.395***	0.418***	0.466***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Observations	1,111	1,111	1,111
R^2	0.164	0.185	0.230
Adjusted R^2	0.148	0.168	0.215
Residual Std. Error	0.260	0.257	0.249
F Statistic	10.167***	11.223***	14.799***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

TABLE S5. Model Predicting Support for Pipelines, Controlling for Treatment

	Dependent variable:		
	Support for Pipelines		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Explicit Prejudice		−0.001	
		(0.009)	
Indigenous Resentment			0.053***
			(0.010)
Right Vote	0.089***	0.089***	0.069***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Ideology	0.021***	0.021***	0.016**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Male	0.047*	0.047*	0.031
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Trade	0.008	0.008	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
BA	0.030	0.030	0.024
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Grad	−0.035	−0.035	−0.029
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
29K or less	−0.077*	−0.077*	−0.071*
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
30K-59K	−0.040	−0.040	−0.033
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
90K-119K	−0.039	−0.039	−0.042
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)
120K-149K	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
150K+	0.057	0.057	0.049
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)

18-34	−0.042	−0.041	−0.035
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
45-54	0.070*	0.070*	0.074**
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
55-64	0.135***	0.135***	0.143***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
65+	0.109**	0.109**	0.119**
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
BC	−0.024	−0.024	−0.041
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Prairies	0.084***	0.085**	0.063*
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)
English Quebec	−0.035	−0.034	−0.033
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Maritimes	−0.008	−0.008	−0.013
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Urban	−0.049*	−0.049*	−0.041
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
treatment2	−0.022	−0.021	−0.025
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
treatment3	−0.015	−0.015	−0.021
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Constant	0.456***	0.456***	0.502***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Observations	1,111	1,111	1,111
R^2	0.168	0.168	0.187
Adjusted R^2	0.151	0.150	0.170
Residual Std. Error	0.304	0.304	0.301
F Statistic	9.960***	9.518***	10.899***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001